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Critical Genocide Studies
Alexander Laban Hinton1
Rutgers University
Over the last two decades, the interdisciplinary ﬁeld of genocide studies has dramatically expanded
and matured. No longer in the shadow of Holocaust studies, it is now the primary subject of journals,
textbooks, encyclopedias, readers, handbooks, special journal issues, bibliographies, workshops, seminars, conference, Web sites, research centers, government agencies, non-governmental organizations,
international organizations, and a unit at the United Nations. If not yet fully theorized, the discipline
is characterized by a number of debates and approaches. As the outlines of the ﬁeld emerge more
clearly, the time is right to engage in critical reﬂections about the state of the ﬁeld, or what might be
called critical genocide studies. The goal is not to be critical in a negative sense but to consider, even
as a canon becomes ensconced, what is said and unsaid, who has voice and who is silenced, and how
such questions may be linked to issues of power and knowledge. It is, in other words, a call for critical
thinking about the ﬁeld of genocide studies itself, exploring our presuppositions, decentering our
biases, and throwing light on blind spots in the hope of further enriching this dynamic ﬁeld.
Key words: genocide, critical theory, mass violence, Lemkin, Holocaust

Over the last two decades, the interdisciplinary ﬁeld of genocide studies has dramatically expanded and matured. Genocide studies no longer stands in the shadow of Holocaust studies. It is now the primary subject of journals, textbooks, encyclopedias,
readers, handbooks, special journal issues, bibliographies, workshops, seminars, conference, Web sites, research centers, government agencies, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and a unit in the United Nations. If not yet fully
theorized, the discipline is characterized by a number of debates and approaches.
As the outlines of the ﬁeld emerge more clearly, the time is right to engage in critical reﬂections about the state of the ﬁeld, or what might be called critical genocide studies. The goal is not to be critical in a negative sense but to consider, even as a canon
becomes ensconced, what is said and unsaid, who has voice and who is silenced, and
how such questions may be linked to issues of power and knowledge. It is, in other
words, a call for critical thinking about the ﬁeld of genocide studies itself, exploring our
presuppositions, decentering our biases, and throwing light on blind spots in the hope
of further enriching this dynamic ﬁeld.
My use of the term “critical genocide studies” overlaps in many ways with that of
A. Dirk Moses,2 whose important historiography of genocide studies reveals much about
the state of the ﬁeld even if our emphases differ somewhat—mine is more concerned
with the decentering associated with Derridian deconstruction and a Foucaultian archeology of knowledge, and his is more concerned with critical theory in the tradition of the
Frankfurt School and recent work on empire and world systems theory.3 A handful of
other scholars, such as Anton Weiss-Wendt, Donald Bloxham, Daniel Feierstein, Thomas
Cushman, Adam Jones, Mark Levene, Jens Meierhenrich, and Dan Stone, have also published works that are partly or largely in the spirit of a critical genocide studies without
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using this name. So it seems that perhaps a threshold has been reached where we can
speak of a critical genocide studies. My thoughts in this necessarily brief article will be
selective, pointing out some of the domains and directions of a critical genocide studies.
Before beginning, I should note that when people sometimes hear a term such as
“deconstruction” or “critical” they dismiss it as “postmodern,” “nihilistic,” or “relativistic.”
All of these terms are complex and have their distinct genealogies. My view is that deconstruction is a method of decentering and critique, and such critique, in the sense of critical inquiry, is at the heart of the academic enterprise and should be front and center in
the ﬁeld of genocide studies. Such reﬂection will only make the ﬁeld stronger and richer.
My perspective is no doubt linked to my own engagement with genocide studies as
I approached it from anthropology, a discipline that has had little voice in the ﬁeld
despite offering important insights into genocide. No doubt this is part of the reason
why a critical genocide studies perspective has been a central focus of the Rutgers Center for the Study of Genocide, Conﬂict Resolution, and Human Rights, even as we have
been programming genocide prevention, a topic that is often viewed in opposition to or
at least in tension with academic genocide studies, let alone critical genocide studies.
My own view is that the study of genocide prevention has much to gain from critical
genocide studies (and vice versa), but the perceived opposition of academic genocide
studies and applied genocide prevention speaks to the scholar/activist divide that is part
of our origin myth.
The Origin Myth
Anthropologists like to examine origin myths, and I am no exception. Ethnicity, we tell
our students, is a social category linking a group of people who perceive themselves to
share ancestry and identity markers (language, food, dress, religion, and so forth). The
sense of ancestry is frequently linked to an origin story, which helps provide a sense of
solidarity and belonging as well as a sense of difference from other ethnic groups. Ethnic categories are ﬂuid and multiple; thus a person might identify him- or herself (or be
identiﬁed) as Chinese, Han, Cantonese, Chinese-American, or American depending on
time and place. I will return to this point later.
Many other sorts of groups are also bound by an origin myth, which provides them
with a sense of solidarity, belonging, and identity. This includes academic disciplines. In
North American anthropology, for example, Franz Boas is venerated as the father of the
discipline and is known, among other things, for reﬁning the anthropological concept
of culture and method of participant observation and for challenging the notion of biological race. Introductory anthropology students often hear stories about his exploits
and efforts to demonstrate that race is a social construction, an endeavor that has continued in North American anthropology into the present.
Within genocide studies, Raphael Lemkin is even more revered as the ﬁeld’s founding father.4 Like Boas, he is remembered for his conceptual work (coining and deﬁning
the term “genocide” and writing a history of genocide), life history (including his escape
from Poland as World War II began and centering on his life-long quest to criminalize
the destruction of human groups), and advocacy (working tirelessly for the passage and
ratiﬁcation of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (UNCG), of which he referred to himself as “the founder”). In
many respects, he has come to be viewed as the prototypical genocide scholar: academically informed yet politically committed to this pressing social issue, an orientation
and a tension that continue to the present. Indeed, the tension between scholarship and
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activism is the Janus face of genocide studies, one that continues to inspire and divide
scholars, as recent controversies over resolutions and the proposed merger of two academic associations illustrate.5 One research direction for a critical genocide studies is to
examine the origins of this Janus face, which has strong roots in modernity, Enlightenment thought, the anti-slavery movement, humanitarianism, and human rights.
The genocide scholar-activist prototype is evident in Pioneers of Genocide Studies,6
an important volume of autobiographical essays written by many of the “ﬁrst generation” of scholars who helped forge the ﬁeld of genocide studies in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. It also includes an abbreviated version of Raphael Lemkin’s unpublished
autobiography, “Totally Unofﬁcial Man.” Many of the Pioneers essays are striking for
their resonance with the Lemkin narrative of ﬁnding one’s calling and becoming passionately engaged in genocide studies and prevention. While this is no doubt partly the
result of the framing questions that were posed to the contributors—the ﬁrst two questions were concerned with what “led” the author to study genocide and how genocide
became “an imperative for you”7—it seems likely that they, like many other genocide
scholars today, see some of Lemkin’s passion in themselves.
Pioneers makes a valuable contribution by chronicling the origins and institutionalization of genocide studies and providing an understanding of some of the varied reasons that scholars entered the ﬁeld. Many had a direct connection to genocide through
the Holocaust or Armenian Genocide; indeed, a few contributors, like Lemkin, escaped
from or even survived Nazi occupation.8 Others came to the ﬁeld more indirectly
through the experience of the 1960s, the civil rights movements, and human rights
activism. By the early 1980s, several landmark texts began to appear, including Leo Kuper’s Genocide: Its Political Uses in the Twentieth Century.9 The ﬁrst conferences on
genocide began to be held, and an incipient network of scholars was being formed, one
that would lead to the 1995 creation of the Association of Genocide Scholars, now the
International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS). The essays in Pioneers are illustrative of genocide studies in others ways, exemplifying the ﬁeld’s interdisciplinarity
and initial concern with a given set of twentieth-century cases, in particular the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust with other mentions of cases such as Biafra and the
Cambodian Genocide.
Genocide Studies and the Holocaust
Pioneers also raises a question: Why did genocide studies begin to emerge in the late
1970s? Why not earlier? Or even in the immediate aftermath of the passage of the
UNCG as accusations of genocide began to ﬂy soon thereafter? Raphael Lemkin himself
sought to indict the Soviet Union for committing genocide during the break-up of the
Baltics by kidnapping Jewish children and “working Jews to death in drainage projects”
in Romania.10
While Cold War concerns and politics were involved, this question points toward
the other key origin of genocide studies: the Holocaust, an event that shadows the discipline, always there even if sometimes in the background or taken for granted. The Lemkin origin story is a perfect example. While Lemkin’s Axis Rule in Occupied Europe11
focuses on the Holocaust and indeed contains many important legal documents, it is
his chapter 4, “Genocide,” that gets all the attention in genocide studies. Perhaps the
Holocaust would have ﬁgured more prominently in this origin story if Lemkin’s attempt
to push genocide to the forefront of the charges at the Nuremberg trials had been successful. As it was, he left Nuremberg early and devoted his efforts to getting genocide
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codiﬁed in international law. The promulgation of the UNCG, not the Holocaust, is frequently viewed as the landmark moment in the genealogy of genocide studies.
This narrative elides the fact that, without the Nazis’ attempted annihilation of
European Jews and other groups, Lemkin’s word might never have made it into the dictionary and the ﬁeld of genocide studies might not exist, Lemkin might have been a forgotten man, and we might very well be talking about “extermination” and “crimes
against humanity” instead of genocide. In other words, no Holocaust (as the Nazi atrocities were later constituted), no Lemkin, no UNCG, no genocide studies. For these and
other reasons, the Nazis’ attempted destruction of the Jews and other groups clearly
stands as a watershed event in the twentieth century, one that helped catalyze the human
rights regime and led to the emergence of genocide studies.
The origins of genocide studies are also closely tied to another discipline that
emerged from the ruins of the Holocaust: Holocaust studies. Even this ﬁeld only began to emerge after the 1960s Eichmann and Auschwitz trials, the publication of
Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and increasing efforts at
memorialization.12
As it grew, Holocaust studies came to be concerned with its own set of issues, including profound questions about uniqueness and representation. In contrast to genocide studies, which has a social science emphasis that I will discuss below, Holocaust
studies has been more often linked to the humanities. As Pioneers illustrates, a number
of ﬁrst-generation genocide scholars split off from Holocaust studies because of their
commitment to comparison, which remains a central theme in genocide studies and
is referred to as comparative genocide studies.13 Indeed, the discipline’s predominant
social science/positivistic orientation is frequently concerned with discerning commonalities and general principles about the phenomenon of genocide, a bias that is in keeping with a normative commitment to prevention. (This theme runs through Holocaust
literature to a lesser extent, in part because of the uniqueness issue which orients
research toward a single past event.) The ﬁeld’s ﬁrst introductory text, Jones’s Genocide:
A Comprehensive Introduction,14 embodies this disciplinary epistemology as the bulk of
the chapters focus on case studies and social scientiﬁc ﬁndings, even as it seeks to decenter some of the ﬁeld’s biases.
Disciplinary Orientations, Blind Spots, and Biases
The different emphases of Holocaust studies provide one vantage through which to
think critically about and discover new approaches to genocide studies. Indeed, some of
the more interesting contemporary work in genocide studies is being done by scholars,
in particular historians, such as Bloxham, Jacques Semelin, Moses, and Stone, who
came to genocide studies from an initial engagement with Holocaust studies. Their
work clearly ﬁts into the rapidly emerging sub-discipline of critical genocide studies. As
genocide studies has matured and the inﬂuence of the uniqueness argument has waned
within Holocaust studies, genocide studies has, in turn, started to enter into the debates
within Holocaust studies. The title of Bloxham’s recent book, The Final Solution: A
Genocide,15 highlights this point.
More broadly, a critical genocide studies would be concerned with exploring other
ﬁelds—to name a few, indigenous studies, philosophy, cultural studies, visual and literary arts, semiotics, and critical theory—that have important insights to bring to bear on
genocide even as they ask us to rethink the existing assumptions of the ﬁeld. To be sure,
there are some scholars from such disciplines who are active in the ﬁeld. However, their
© 2012
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voices, as well as the larger insights that may be gleaned from their home disciplines,
tend to be more muted than historical and social scientiﬁc scholarship in the ﬁeld.
Yet another fertile direction for research in critical genocide studies comes from
scholars working outside of the North American and European regions in which genocide studies has emerged. One illustration of this point is Feierstein’s work as well as
that of other Latin American scholars who are questioning the boundaries of genocide
studies from an alternative regional and Spanish-language perspective.16 Such scholarship helps genocide studies interrogate its possible ethnocentric assumptions and discover new ways to envision the ﬁeld.
The Anthropology of Genocide
My own engagement with genocide studies, which began in the early 1990s when I
began conducting research on the Cambodian Genocide as a graduate student and attending IAGS meetings, has in a sense followed along these lines in terms of approaching the ﬁeld from an outside perspective. When I attended my ﬁrst IAGS meeting in
1995 I was surprised to ﬁnd only one or two other anthropologists in attendance (Robert Hitchcock and Pamela Ballinger, if I recall correctly). Genocide studies was also
barely on the radar in anthropology, despite the important work that had been done on
indigenous peoples.17 Likewise, some of the relevant concerns and insights of anthropology were completely outside the orbit of genocide studies.
The cultural patterning of violence provides one illustration of this point. Because
of their long-standing immersion in and in-depth understanding of given societies,
anthropologists are ideally positioned to provide an experience-based perspective on
how genocides unfold, how they are understood by both elite and lower-level actors,
and how people deal with the experience and aftermaths of genocide. Thus, on the one
hand, an anthropological perspective complicates easy assumptions about state ideology
and agency/motivation. To understand motivation and process, then, one needs to
grasp the local understandings that mediate social practices. This can be seen in a variety of domains, ranging from the elite’s deliberations to the conﬁnes of the torture
chamber. The rigid model of state ideology–perpetrator motivation breaks down from
this perspective, refocusing our attention on process and context. I have sought to illustrate this point in relationship to the Cambodian Genocide even as a small but growing scholarship on genocide has emerged within anthropology in part because of the
genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda.18
On the other hand, an anthropological perspective suggests that we need to broaden
our concerns about the aftermaths of genocide. Usually, this issue is largely glossed over
with the assumption—yet again linked to the Janus face of genocide studies—that prevention is the primary normative goal. This is certainly a critical and admirable aim.
However, the ﬁxation on prevention may divert our attention away from another critical
issue: how people deal with the experience and aftermaths of genocide.
Perusing through the key references on genocide uncovers little concern with this
issue. Aftermaths usually mean a concern with denial and legal redress. (Holocaust studies provides another interesting foil in this regard as the ﬁeld has been deeply concerned
with issues of trauma and memory.) Given their on-the-ground interactions with perpetrators and victims, anthropologists have been able to provide a new way of looking at issues of experience, coping, ritual, and memory. There is even a growing literature within
anthropology that seeks to explore the local understandings and social practices that
undergird the human rights regime, including transitional justice mechanisms such as
© 2012
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tribunals.19 All of this is not to say that we should ignore the issue of prevention, but
rather that we should instead cast our gaze on a wider range of aftermaths. Moreover,
prevention is also at stake here since past genocide, including issues of local experience,
coping, and memory, is one of the possible primes for future genocide.20
Deﬁnition
An anthropological perspective also raises important questions about the issue of deﬁnition, one of the central concerns of genocide studies. First there is the semantic question: What does “genocide” mean in different societies where genocide is taking or has
taken place? For the term genocide emerged at a given moment in time and in a particular context. What do we miss when we label mass violence “genocide” without seeking
to ask what such violence means in given context? Jones’s introductory text touches on
this point, listing different terms.21 But to truly understand genocide, we need to grapple with local glosses, which may inﬂect our analysis in new directions and toward previously unrecognized dynamics and meanings. This is all the more critical after the fact,
given the correlation between memory and genocide.
A second and related question also emerges: What are the categories that victims
and perpetrators use to label and understand one another? This question, with which
scholars had been grappling on an academic level since the early 1980s, gained legal
salience in the 1990s with the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR) and the ensuing difﬁculties of
ﬁtting terms such as “Hutu” and “Tutsi” into the rigid categories of the UNCG. From
an anthropological perspective, the reiﬁcation of race, ethnicity, religion, and nationality
seems both ethnocentric and misleading. To argue that race is immutable, a key trope
of debate when the UNCG was being promulgated (and one that was made when
notions of biological race still predominated), is to implicitly reassert an essentialized
conception of race that has been used by perpetrator regimes and has long since been
shown by people like Boas to be a social myth. Race is a social construction and,
like ethnicity, religion, and nationality, is clearly, and often highly, mutable. Perhaps
one of the more informative illustrations of this point is the not-so-distant assertion
that the Irish were a race of savages. Or one can travel to a country like Brazil, where
racial categories have very different valences. More disturbingly, the UNCG has created
a set of privileged protected groups while leaving others unprotected and analytically
invisible.
By starting with contextualized, as opposed to rigid, pre-existing socio-legal categories, a critical genocide studies might help us understand how a wide variety of identities, including non-Western ones, crystallize (i.e., shift from a more ﬂuid state to one
that, at a given moment in time, becomes less ﬂuid, or what I have elsewhere called the
“crystallization of difference”22) in a variety of genocidal situations. From this perspective, the UNCG deﬁnition23 constitutes a historical and social construction that, while
having important legal implications, should have been more broadly deﬁned to include
the destruction of any sort of group as deﬁned by the protagonists in genocide. Some
scholars have usefully proposed something along these lines in terms of deﬁnition,24
but scholarly deﬁnitions of genocide tend to be clunky and awkward. There are
strengths and weaknesses to a more or less detailed deﬁnition.
My own view is that there is also much to be said for deﬁnitions which accord
with the principle of economy that less is more and that open rather than foreclose
analysis. While recognizing that all deﬁnitions have weaknesses, we might simply deﬁne
© 2012
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genocide as the more or less coordinated attempt to destroy a dehumanized and excluded group of people because of who they are.
Viewing genocide as “more or less coordinated” allows for the inclusion of cases
that range from highly planned, state-sponsored genocides to those that are more haphazard and diffusely carried out. In the latter case, the state’s role might have more to do
with permissibility than with intent (e.g., not forbidding or doing nothing about acts of
genocide that are carried out by armed groups on the ground or allowing victim groups
to live under conditions of life that lead to their destruction, as in the case of many
Native American genocides). The destruction of a group may be in whole or in part.
Such a deﬁnition has signiﬁcant implications, opening the door to cultural genocide, genocide committed by non-state agents, genocide by neglect, and genocide of
political, economic, social, and other groups as constituted in speciﬁc historical and cultural contexts. It also allows us to escape the rash of “-cides,” such as “politicide,” which
have been proposed to overcome the gaps in the UNCG. We need, in other words, to
explore a much wider range of cases, including those in which there was a more haphazard attempt to destroy a group or a group was destroyed over time by more indirect
means, including structural ones,25 or by neglect and indifference. This deﬁnition is
more in the spirit of Israel Charny’s too-often-dismissed application of the term genocide to almost any targeted civilian group. However, it goes one step further by opening
up the possibility that non-civilian groups might be the target of genocide (e.g., the attempted mutual destruction of two highly armed protagonists in the course of war).
In the end, we might view the above deﬁnition as a methodological deﬁnition,
although of course all deﬁnitions have methodological implications. By this I am suggesting that genocide scholars deploy a broad deﬁnition for the purposes of analysis,
one that allows us to consider the widest range of cases. Whatever bottom-line deﬁnition of genocide a scholar selects in the end, a methodological deﬁnition would contribute to his or her research by providing additional case material, including (for those
who adhere to a more narrow deﬁnition) information on why genocide does not take
place in certain situations, an area of study that Kuper so nicely illustrated but that has
never been taken up in a signiﬁcant way by scholars in the ﬁeld. A critical genocide studies invites us to take such chances by exploring new areas that have been cordoned off
by prevailing assumptions, biases, and gate-keeping maneuvers.
For example, one of the critiques of such a broad deﬁnition invokes what might
be called the dilution metaphor. If we open the door to a very broad array of cases, the
argument goes, we “dilute” the meaning and power of the term. Dilution is an interesting term, conjuring up the image of a pure substance being adulterated by an implicitly
contaminating extraneous element (it is, ironically, the sort of metaphor that is often
linked to genocide). But who determines what is extraneous? The dilution trope is a
gate-keeper notion that asserts case-study primacy and relevance on the basis of embodied metaphor, not critical analysis. There is no a priori reason why genocide should
encompass a smaller set of cases. Indeed, the ﬁeld of genocide studies might experience
enormous growth and vitality by opening the doors to a much broader range of cases.
Recent scholarship in critical genocide studies has moved in this direction, seeking to
explore what would happen if genocide were to encompass a much broader range of
cases, including the many forgotten genocides.26
Even if it stayed in the background, the Holocaust very much put its imprint on
the UNCG and many of the subsequent scholarly deﬁnitions that emphasize intent,
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particularly with regard to the role of the state. And perhaps we have all missed much
by focusing so much on the classic deﬁnition. Recent research in cognitive science, for
example, has shown that categorical understanding is very much tied to metaphor, metonymy, and prototype effects.27 In other words, people think about phenomena like
genocide through metaphor, metonymy, and prototypes. While this potential shift in
the way in which we think about deﬁnition and genocide could be an article in and of
itself, I want here just to note the somewhat obvious point that the Holocaust has long
served as the prototype of genocide and Auschwitz as one of its key metonyms. What
this means is that in the back of our minds many, if not most, of us have the Holocaust
prototype in mind when discoursing about genocide.
The uniqueness debate suggests this bias, but we ﬁnd it in many contexts, ranging
from issues of deﬁnition to canonization. The Holocaust is also often the case-study
exemplar that implicitly stands in danger of categorical dilution through association
with other, less exemplary cases. The uniqueness debate provides another manifestation
of this point. The obvious salience of the Holocaust notwithstanding, there are other
possible prototypes and exemplars, including the massive destruction of largely forgotten peoples, such as the Taíno of Hispaniola during the conquest and colonization of
the New World or the large number of political groups that perished under Stalin or in
Maoist China. What if these cases were the starting points of genocide studies? A critical
genocide studies asks us to consider what such a rethinking of the concept of genocide
might entail.
A related decentering comes from a reconsideration of Lemkin’s work. While still
heavily inﬂuenced by the Holocaust prototype, Lemkin’s conception had a broad historical purview and analytical focus on the different ways in which group life is destroyed,
which he viewed as potentially encompassing not only physical but also biological, cultural, and political destruction carried out by state and non-state actors. Over the last
decade there has been a growing body of work that conceptualizes genocide from an
often Lemkinian perspective, with its long historical purview, interest in antiquity and
colonialism, and understanding that genocide might unfold over the course of long periods of time (as opposed to the short duration of most of the case studies on which genocide studies tends to focus) and through a variety of mechanisms (again, beyond the
usual focus on state-sponsored mass murder), including cultural destruction. Accordingly, scholars have begun to consider what were largely forgotten genocides by increasingly focusing on issues such as colonialism, conquest, settler societies, and modernity.28
This is the work of a critical genocide studies, but there remains much more to do as
such cases tend to be relegated to the margins of the genocide studies canon.
Why have we ignored these cases? The reasons are manifold and complex. The
Holocaust prototype is one as it directs our attention to a certain manifestation of the
genocidal process, foregrounding state and ideology. Perceived relevance might be
another factor as scholars have witnessed a number of cases of genocide take place during their lifetime (even if we have also ignored other contemporary cases, such as the
plight of indigenous peoples). There is also more information available about many of
these cases, making it easier to research and write about them. As disciplinary structures
of knowledge become ensconced, habit and tradition, as well as the interests that sustain
them, also become factors in directing our attention to certain cases.
Metanarratives of progress and civilization might also structure our thinking, directing our gaze to genocidal despots (Hitler, Pol Pot, Milošević, al-Bashir) and authoritarian
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regimes. The language of the UNCG codiﬁes this language, stating that genocide is
“condemned by the civilized world”29 (Lemkin himself frequently used this register).
Such language implies that genocide is only carried out by barbarians and savages, an
understanding condensed by symbols such as the shrunken head that was found at the
Buchenwald camp and exhibited at Nuremberg. While genocide is brutal and to be condemned, it is also something that is closely intertwined with modernity and even
democracy.30 The discipline’s long-standing neglect of Native Americans, slavery, and
indigenous peoples illustrates this point.31
A critical genocide studies asks us to consider why scholars have looked away from
such issues. One reason may well be a “liberal” tendency32 among genocide scholars to
seek “progress” and, as the UNCG states, “to liberate mankind from such an odious
scourge.”33 We return to the Janus face of the discipline. A critical genocide studies
does not demand that we give up this objective but instead that we think critically about
its genealogy/framings and our potential conceptual biases and thereby ﬁnd new ways
to approach the problem. For example, how does the image of the “savage”/“barbaric”
Other we construct in our analyses also construct, through inversion, an image of us as
modern, developed, and civilized? What do we miss by such identiﬁcations? One
answer is that our gaze might too easily be directed away from the relationship between
genocide and modernity and toward explanations that smack of ethnic primordialism,
stage theory (an implied progression from a state of savagery to civilization), atavism
(the Nazis as a throwback), or biological/psychological reductionism (our “barbaric” or
“sadistic” “nature”—think of Lord of the Flies and Psycho34).
Canonization
Such decenterings ask us to think critically about the canons that have emerged in genocide studies. To date there has been a strong bias toward a genocide studies canon,
which is approximated in Figure 1.
With certain exceptions, the bulk of scholarship in the ﬁeld of genocide studies,
especially from the 1980s through the 1990s, has focused on the Twentieth-Century
Core, with the Holocaust both in the foreground and in the background in the ways discussed above. Like all canons, there has been ﬂuidity within the canon as the status of
some groups has changed (e.g., there is the beginning of a shift in the status of Ottoman
Assyrian and Greek Genocides from Forgotten Genocides to the Periphery or perhaps
even Second Circle).
The model of the genocide studies canon is, of course, an ideal type, but it gestures
toward some of the disciplinary biases that have emerged in the ﬁeld. For example,
while cutting against the grain in many ways and discussing the Periphery or even Forgotten Genocides at times, Jones’s introductory text still gives primacy to the TwentiethCentury Core, likely because this is what people usually teach about.35 A similar statement could be made about readers and edited volumes in the ﬁeld.36 A critical genocide
studies asks us all to consider how such biases have shaped our own research and teaching and, though decentering, to re-envision our ﬁeld of study.
As this discussion suggests, issues of deﬁnition and canonization are not valueneutral but are also linked to issues of power and knowledge. Why, we must ask, is it
that certain cases of genocide are forgotten? The literature on denial (which has its own
Janus face of ensuring historical accuracy about horrible events while potentially diminishing debate) has grappled with this question. But we also need to consider why we
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Prototype

Holocaust

The Triad

Holocaust
Armenian Genocide
Rwanda

Twentieth-Century Core

Holocaust
Armenians
Cambodia
Rwanda
Bosnia
Darfur (twenty-ﬁrst century)
Indigenous peoples (taken as a whole)

The Second Circle

East Pakistan
Kurdish case
Guatemala
Herero/Nimibian
Kosovo
Carthage
Settler genocides
Ukrainian/Soviet

The Periphery

Indonesia
Argentina
Speciﬁc cases of indigenous peoples
Genocides of antiquity
Assyrian and Greek cases
East Timor
Burundi
Maoist China
Democratic Republic of the Congo

Forgotten Genocides

Multitude of more or less invisible/hidden/forgotten cases

Figure 1: The genocide studies canon

focus on certain cases and topics and what sorts of inclusions and exclusions ensue.
What is left invisible to us and what can we do to cast light on what has formerly been
opaque? Given the inevitable politicization of our topic, how might we be inﬂuenced
by given interests and agendas? Why, we need to ask, are certain cases forgotten, remembered, recognized, or even intentionally hidden or written out of history? For our
discipline to ﬂourish, we need to consider a wide range of such questions, to decenter
and rethink our taken-for-granted assumptions and biases, to seek out new ways to
approach the ﬁeld, and to engage in critical genocide studies.
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